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LABOR LAW-The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act Is
Not Applicable to Strikes by Public Sector
Employees and Such Strikes Are Illegal Per Se
-City

of Pana v. Crowe

We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not
an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that
public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.'

With that pronouncement, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished the
doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability in Illinois. It is now
time for the court to address itself to the issue of another sovereignty
question: the right of public employees in general, and school teachers in particular, to strike. The court had an opportunity in its recent decision of City of Pana v. Crowe2 to deal forthrightly with the
question of strikes in the public sector. This article will review the
Pana decision and its effect on the legality of public employee strikes
and will additionally examine the application of the Illinois Anti-Injunction Law' to such strikes.
CITY OF PANA V. CROWE

The case arose as a result of a strike by employees of the City of
Pana's water, sewer, street and police departments. The city obtained
a temporary injunction ex parte and, following a hearing, a permanent injunction. 4 Defendants appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court,
1. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26, 163
N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959).
2. 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (1973).
4. On June 12, 1972, the circuit court of Christian County issued a temporary in-

junction and, on July 23, 1972, a permanent injunction restraining the individual defendants and Local No. 726 of American Federation of State and Municipal Employees
(A.F.S.M.E.) from the following acts:
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Fifth District, contending that the injunction was issued in violation
of the express terms of the anti-injunction act. 5
In reversing the lower court, the appellate court noted that in Board
of Education of Community Unit School District No. 2 v. Redding,' the Illinois Supreme Court had declared that public policy
transcends the right of school employees to strike, but had made no
mention of the anti-injunction statute. 7 Finding Redding inapplicable, the court turned to two decisions which had dealt squarely with
the anti-injunction act, Peters v. South Chicago Community Hospital' and County of Peoria v. Benedict. In the Peters case, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to apply the public policy exemption of
Redding and held the anti-injunction act applicable to not-for-profit
hospitals. In -the subsequent Benedict decision, the court applied the
Peters reasoning to a strike by public employees of a nursing home.
Persuaded by this Peters-Benedict rationale, the appellate court in
Pana deemed itself compelled to hold the anti-injunction act applicable to the case at hand. 10
The court went on to note that the anti-injunction act is the only
legislative expression of public policy with regard to the labor relations of these municipal employees. It concluded by expressing dissatisfaction with the legislature for not enacting comprehensive legislation appropriate to public employees. This inaction, the court observed, has forced the judiciary to establish a segmented and piecemeal approach to labor relations in the public sector."
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. Justice Schaefer, speaking for a unanimous court, stated that:
In our opinion neither the Peters case nor the Benedict case requires
(a) Engaging in a strike or any form of cessation of work against the City
of Pana;
Hindering or obstructing in any manner the use and maintenance of the
building, structures, machinery, and equipment owned, rented, maintained
and used by the City of Pana, in its governmental or proprietary functions.
City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 548, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
5. City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 11. App. 3d 90, 299 N.E.2d 770 (1973), rev'd, 57
Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
6. 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (a strike by school custodial workers).
7. City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 Ill. App. 3d 90, 92, 299 N.E.2d 770, 771 (1973),
rev'd, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
8. 44 Ill. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969) (a strike by employees of a not-for-profit
hospital).
9. 47 Ill. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971) (a
strike by employees of a nursing home operated by Peoria County pursuant to statutory
authorization).
10. City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 111. App. 3d 90, 93, 299 N.E.2d 770, 772 (1973),
rev'd, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
11. Id. at 94, 299 N.E.2d at 773.
(b)
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,that we depart in -this case from the long-standing rule that public
employees have no right to strike and that a strike by them is unlawful and therefore not within the scope of the anti-injunction
2
act.'

The court's conclusion is based on the following propositions: (i)
all strikes by public employees are per se unlawful and (ii) the
anti-injunction act does not apply to unlawful work stoppages by public employees. The rationale behind these propositions will be examined in detail in the course of this article.
STRIKES PER SE ILLEGAL

In stating its position that public employee strikes are illegal, the
Pana court reiterated the holding of the leading Illinois case in this
area, Board of Education v. Redding. Justice Daily, speaking for
the court in Redding, made the following observation:
Although this is a case of first impression in a reviewing court of
this jurisdiction, it is, so far as we can ascertain, the universal view
that there is no inherent right in municipal employees to strike
against their governmental employer, whether Federal, State, or
a political subdivision thereof, and that a strike of municipal employees for any purpose is illegal. The underlying basis for the
policy against strikes by public employees is the sound and demanding notion that governmental functions may not ,be impeded or
obstructed, as well as the concept that the profit motive, inherent
in the principle of free enterprise, is absent in the governmental
function. 13
The Redding case involved a strike by thirteen custodial workers
against the school board in an attempt to gain bargaining recognition. The trial court refused to grant an injunction. On appeal, the
supreme court reversed on the ground that municipal employees have
no inherent right to strike. The rationale and holding of Redding has
been used by Illinois courts to invalidate strikes by firemen, policemen
and schoolteachers. 4
This reliance on Redding patently ignores the substantial changes
in public sector labor relations since 1965. As will be discussed more
fully below, much of the foundation of the Redding decision has
been eroded since its pronouncement. It is no longer the "universal
12.

57 I11.
2d 547, 552, 316 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1974).

13.
14.

32 I11.
2d 567, 571-72, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965).
See City of Rockford v. Local 413, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 98 Ill. App. 2d

36, 39, 240 N.E.2d 705, 706 (1968)

(firemen); Fletcher v. Civil Service Comm. of

Waukegan, 6 1I1. App. 3d 593, 598, 286 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1972) (policemen); Allen
v. Maurer, 6 111. App. 3d 633, 640, 286 N.E.2d 135, 142 (1972) (school teachers).
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view" that strikes by all public employees are illegal. This is particularly true of school employees, the group directly involved in Redding.
Legislative Activity
There have been numerous attempts in Illinois to enact legislation
which would provide a basic framework for public sector labor relations. 15 Two separate investigative commissions have recommended
the adoption of appropriate legislation, but none has been forthcoming."' This reprehensible lack of legislative action has left the judiciary without any absolute basis for modifying their present Reddingbased philosophy. 1 7 However, there are ascertainable trends which
should not be ignored.
Following the 1967 Kerner Report, legislative efforts based on its
recommendations were unsuccessful.
The failure was apparently
caused by the no-strike provision of the proposed law." s The 1971
Ogilvie Report altered the Kerner Report's recommendations by concluding that:
[A] limited right to strike [should] be allowed public employees
whose continued service at the time is not held vital to public
health, safety, or welfare, provided that impasse procedures have
run their course.' 9
Bills reflecting this changing attitude have been introduced, 20 and one
particular bill pertaining solely to school employees, H.B. 1652,
passed the House in 1973 but failed by four votes to secure removal
from the Senate Labor Laws Committee. The bill provided for a limited
right to strike, and specifically declared the anti-injunction law applica21
ble to such strikes.
15. See Clark, Public Employee Labor Legislation: A Study of the Unsuccessful Attempt to Enact a Public Employee Bargaining Statute in Ill'nois, 20 LAB. L.J. 164
(1969); Derber, Labor-Management Policy for Public Employees in Illinois: The Experience of the Governor's Commission, 21 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 541 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Derber]; Goldstein, Current Trends in Public Employee Labor Law in
Illinois: Alice-In-Wonderland Revisited?, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 382, 384 (1973) [herein-

after cited as Goldstein].
16.

GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT

EMPLOYEES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

(March,

1967)

POLICY FOR PUBLIC

[hereinafter cited as

KERNER REPORT]; COMMISSION ON LABOR LAWS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

1971 ) [hereinafter cited as
17.

(April,

OGILVIE REPORT].

See generally Shaw and Clark, The Need for Public Employee Labor Legislation

in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 628 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as Shaw and Clark]; Kiley, A

Public Employee Labor Act in Illinois? Clear Need With No Clear Solution, 4 LOYOLA

U. CHI. L.J. 309 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kiley]; Goldstein, supra note 15, at 400.
18.
19.

See Derber, supra note 15, at 557.
OGILVIE REPORT, supra note 16, at 19.

20. See, e.g., S.B. 949, 78th General Assembly of Illinois (1973-74); H.B. 1652, H.B.
1518, H.B. 448, 78th General Assembly of Illinois (1973-74); S.B. 1112, 77th General
Assembly of Illinois (1971-72); H.B. 3632, H.B. 1, 77th General Assembly of Illinois
(1971-72).
21. H.B. 1652, 78th General Assembly of Illinois (1973). The pertinent section provides as follows:
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The supreme court's answer to this legislative impasse was simply:
The General Assembly has acquiesced in the conclusion of this
court and the appellate court with respect to the unlawfulness of
strikes of public employees. 22
While this may be technically correct, it belies the realities of the legislature's present tenor. It is, in fact, stalemated by the no-strike is23
sue.
In an effort to provide some relief for the public employee situation, Governor Walker issued an Executive Order in 1973 establishing collective bargaining procedures for employees working for agencies and departments subject to the Governor.2 4 Conspicuously absent from this order was any mention of strikes.25
While the Illinois Legislature has failed to provide the direly needed
framework, other states have not been so dilatory. At the time of the
Pana decision, six state legislatures had provided school employees with
a limited right to strike. 2" In addition, "teacher only" bargaining statSec. 13. Strikes. (A) Public school employees included within an appropriate unit for which an exclusive bargaining representative has been certified
or which is represented by an exclusive bargaining representative under Section
6(E) shall not engage in a strike except under the following conditions:
(1) the procedures set forth under Sections 12(A) and (B) have been completely utilized and exhausted with respect to such unit;
(2) at least 3 days have elapsed after a notice of intent to strike has been
given by the exclusive bargaining representative to the public school employer
and to the Board;
(3) the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, if any, has expired.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if in the opinion of a public school employer
a strike is or has become a clear and present danger or threat to the health
or safety of the public, it may initiate in the circuit court of the county in
which such danger or threat exists an action for equitable relief including, but
not limited to, injunction. The court may grant appropriate relief upon the
finding that such clear and present danger or threat exists. An unfair practice
by a public school employer shall not be a defense to an illegal strike. The
jurisdiction of the court under this Section is limited by "An Act relating to
disputes concerning terms and conditions of employment," approved June 19,
1925.

22. City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 I11. 2d 547, 552, 316 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1974).
23. See Kiley, supra note 17, at 311-12.
24. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 6 (Sept. 4, 1973). See also Goldstein, supra note 15,
at 385-90. Excluded from coverage by the Order are employees of local agencies such
as teachers, firemen and policemen. Coverage is extended only to employees who are
paid by voucher subject to the approval of the Department of Finance.
25. See Goldstein, supra note 15, at 394.
26. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (grants right to strike for certain public employees, including school teachers, until it can be shown that it threatens the health,
safety, or welfare of the public; HAWAII REV. STAT., tit. 7, § 89-12 (Supp. 1973) (strikes
authorized if not endangering public health or safety); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.647 (Supp. 1973) (strikes allowed where employer refuses to abide by arbitrator's award,
or refuses to request binding arbitration); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.726 (1973) (strike
allowed if procedures followed and no threat to health, safety or welfare of the public);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §U 1101.1001-.1003 (Supp. 1974) (strike authorized if impasse
procedures exhausted and no clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or
welfare of the public); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 2010 (Supp. 1974) (injunctions denied
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tutes are currently in effect in seventeen states2 7 and at least -twelve
other states include teachers in their public employee bargaining statutes.2 This is not meant to suggest that the no-strike issue is undergoing complete metamorphosis, as the vast majority of states still prohibit strikes of any kind by public employees.2 9 However, a judiciary
forced into making public policy decisions should be cognizant of
what changes are occurring and react to trends which may be developing. The supreme court not only failed to re-evaluate their position in Pana, but failed to even acknowledge that any change has
taken place.
Common Law Activity
As was previously noted, the Pana court relied on the prior Redding
decision in denying all public employees the right to strike under any
condition.30
Since 1965, however, there has been a substantial
amount of case law recognizing and defining the rights of public employees, particularly teachers. Here in Illinois, courts have found that
school boards and teacher associations may enter into collective bargaining agreements. 31 They have acknowledged the right of free association by teachers. 3 2 They have decided what matters may, in
the board's discretion, be delegated 38 and they have defined who has
standing to sue to enjoin a teachers' strike. 4 The courts have gone
so far as to require negotiation in open court.3 5
This activity has been supplemented by the United States Supreme Court's proscription of certain state denials of protected
rights. Most of the cases have dealt with freedom of speech and association. The Court warned of "unwarranted inhibition upon the
unless strike poses a clear and present danger to a sound program of school education
which is in the best public interest to prevent).
27. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland,

Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and
Washington.
28. Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
29. See J. Peterson, STATE EDUCATION AGENCY ROLES IN TEACHER COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONs 5-8 (Report of Illinois Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction)
(1974); 37 A.L.R.3d 1147 (1971).
30. See text accompanying note 13, supra.
31. Chicago Div. I11.Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Education, 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222
N.E.2d 243 (1966).
32. Chicago High School Assistant Principals Ass'n v. Bd. of Ed. of Chicago, 5 Ill.
App. 3d 672, 284 N.E.2d 14 (1972); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1968).
33. Board of Education v. Rockford Education Association, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 280
N.E.2d 286 (1972).
34. Allen v. Maurer, 6 Ill. App. 3d 633, 286 N.E.2d 135 (1972).
35. Kiley, supra note 17, at 315 n.22.
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free spirit of teachers" in Shelton v. Tuckers ' and, in Garrity v. State
o1 New Jersey, Justice Douglas stated:
We conclude that policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not
relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.
There are rights of constitutional stature 3whose
exercise a State
7
may not condition by the exaction of a price.
The Court went even further in repudiating the distinction in constitutional status of public and private employees in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents of University of State of New York, where the Court held:
[C]onstitutional doctrine . . . has rejected [the premise] that
public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon !the surrender of constitutional rights which could
not be abridged by direct government action.
• . .[T]he Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly said
in an earlier stage of this case, ". . . the -theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly
rejected." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239.38
With these cases providing the foundation, defenders of striking
public employees have argued that an absolute prohibition of strikes
raises constitutional questions of (i) involuntary servitude and (ii)
the due process and equal protection standards of the fourteenth
amendment. 39 Judicial reaction to these arguments have been generally unfavorable.
The involuntary servitude argument is usually made when a court
has enjoined a strike and ordered the striking employees back to
work. In response, courts have answered that the employees can
quit, and thus avoid working against their will.40
The due process-equal protection argument is more fervently and
frequently offered, but has met with limited acceptance."
A variant of this argument was presented in the Pana case by the Illinois
Education Association as amicus curiae. The reasoning is syllogistic:
36. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
37. 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (emphasis added).
38. 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
39. D. WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS
6:118 (Ircorporating 1973 Supplement) (1974) [hereinafter cited as D. WOLLETr &

R.

CHANIN].

40. See, e.g., Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Public Instruction,
214 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1968); In re Block, 50 N.J. 494, 499, 236 A.2d 589, 592 (1967).
41. See Anderson Federation of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558,
568, 251 N.E.2d 15, 21, cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1969) (dissenting opinion); cf.
United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 885 (1971) (concurring
opinion); School Committee of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, - R.I. -, -, 299
A.2d 441, 446 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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1. Private employees and public employees both have a right, con42
stitutionally, to bargain collectively.
2. Bargaining collectively encompasses a right to strike of constitutional stature, limited only where its purpose is destructive or
effect harmful to the public health or safety.43
3. Therefore, public employees have conditional strike rights, pro44
hibited only when irreparable injury or harm would occur.
The Pana court failed to deal with the issues presented by this argument. Those courts which have considered the argument have generally denied it by listing the various differences between public and private employees and concluding that, a fortiori, a legitimate distinction is
constitutionally permissible.4" This provides a second line of attack
against the proposition that public employee strikes are per se illegal,
for if the reasons for differentiation are without merit, it logically follows that the denial of equal protection is improper. It is at 'this level
that public policy considerations arise and, quite expectedly, that
disagreement as to the solution reaches its peak.
DistinguishingFactors
There are generally three alternative reasons given for distinguish42. Brief for Illinois Education As-ociation as Amicus Curiae at 4. City of Pana v.
Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
See D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, supra
note 39, at 6:122. This premise is based on Keyishian v. Board of Reeents of University of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967), Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967), and Chicago Division of Ill. Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d
456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
43. Brief for Illinois Education Association as Amicus Curiae at 6, City of Pana v.
Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974). This premise construes N.L.R.B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). as rec-cniz;n - tbp roht to ctrike ac bi""
.
compassed within the right to bargain, and prohibited only if destructive or harmful to
the public health. This is further suppo:ted by Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311
(1926), where Justice Brande's accepted that "[n]either the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike," but it is contended that h* established that right to be constitutionally protected and thus any attempt to limit it
should be carefully scrutinized. The last supportive case cited is Stapleton v. Mitchell,
60 F. Supp. 51, 61 (D. Kan. 1945), where the court stated:
The right to peaceably strike or to participate in one, to work or refus , to
work, and to choose the terms and conditions under which one will work, like
the right to make a speech, are fundamental human liberties which the state
may not condition or abridge in the absence of grave and immediate danger
to the community.
These authorities provide the basis for the conclusion that strikes not posing a serious
threat to the public health and safety are within the province of constitutional protection,
and that based on Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
and N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), an attemnt to prohibit public school
employees from doing what their private scl-ool counterparts are allowed can be upheld
only on the most compelling showing of necessity.
44. Brief for Illinois Education Association as Amicus Curiae at 9, City of Pana v.
Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
45. See. e.g., City of New Yok v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 186, 285 N.Y.S.2d
901, 909, 243 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1968).
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ing public employee strikes from those by private sector employees.
The first involves the doctrine of governmental sovereignty. While
the specific argument may vary, the overall theme is that a strike
against the government is tantamount to denial of its authority and a
form of insurrection.4 6 The second involves the type of services rendered. It presupposes that governmental functions are essential and
that a strike disrupting this service contravenes the public welfare and
results in a paralysis of society.4 7 The third reason is basically political.
It is maintained that by allowing public employees to strike, the politi48
cal process will become distorted.
Sovereignty
The notion that strikes against the government are in defiance of
its authority as the sovereign is becoming largely anachronisitic.49 In
its original form, the argument was predicated on the belief that governmental employees were essentially agents of the government and,
as such, were exercising a portion of the sovereign power. Thus, a
strike by them would be a strike against government itself and in essence a rebellion or insurrection."0 The fault with this premise is its
failure to distinguish between the various functions performed by
government, specifically government as authority versus government
as employer. If the argument is to maintain validity, it must logically follow that the governmental function as authority is somehow impinged, since a strike against an employer is not, in and of itself, an
activity of insurrectional dimension. This possibility is negated by
46. E.g., Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 276, 83
A.2d 482, 485 (1951), in which the court said: "In the American system, sovereignty
is inherent in the people. They can delegate it to a government . . . [whichl must employ people to carry on its task. . . . They occupy a status entirely different from those
who carry on a private enterpr:se. . . . To say that they can strike is the equivalent
of saying that they can deny the authority of government and contravene the public welfare .... ." Also, in City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364,
371, 141 A.2d 624, 628 (1958), the court said:
The teachers who were involved in the strike in the instant case are, therefore,
agents of the state government and as such exercise a portion of the sovereign
power ....
[I~t has been generally held that persons exercising a portion of the sovereign
power have no right to strike against the government, be it federal, state or
a political subdivision thereof.
47. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill.
2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); Anderson Federation of Teachers v. School City of
Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969).
48. See Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1124-25 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wellington & Winter].
49. D. WOLLETr & R. CHANIN, supra note 39, at 6:114.
50. See City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d
624 (1958).
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the realization that most governmental agencies, especially school
boards, are given a wide range of discretion in executing their duties. Until express statutory duties are violated, agreements between
school boards and teacher associations fall within this range of discretion. Therefore, as long as the agency or school board is not
forced into abrogating its statutory obligations, its authority has not
been denied and a rebellion or insurrection has not taken place.5
The Illinois Supreme Court did not specifically use this sovereignty
argument in Redding or Pana as a basis for finding public sector
strikes illegal. However, much of the foundation for the conclusion
in Redding that strikes impede and obstruct governmental functions
52
is based on authority from other states which had used this rationale.
In fact, the Redding court quoted extensively from City of Pawtucket
v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance5" as providing persuasive reasoning
for its decision.5 4 Pawtucket involved a 1958 strike by teachers in
Providence County, Rhode Island. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the lower court's grant of a preliminary injunction. In
so doing, the court based its holding on the fact that teachers are an
integral part of local government, that as such they are governmental agents exercising a portion of the sovereign power with no legal right to strike against the city, and that such a strike is illegal
and subject to an injunction.
In addition, in subsequent cases the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that a distinguishing aspect of the Redding case was that it
involved school employees.55 As such, their strike activity is curtailed by the public policy pronouncement of the 1870 Constitution
which stated that the General Assembly has the duty to "provide a
thorough and efficient system of free schools." 56 The court's conclu51. Adding further to the demise of the sovereignty rationale has been the recent
rejection by most courts of the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability.

See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 984-87 (4th ed. 1971).
52. Subsequent developments in nine of the eleven cited jurisdictions have altered the
effect of these cases as authority. Eight of the states (California, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and Washington) have enacted
legislation covering teacher bargaining. The courts of three states (Michigan, New
Hampshire and Rhode Island) have modified their prior decisions and now refuse to

grant injunctions without a showing of irreparable harm.

See School Board for the City

of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W,2d 206 (1968); Timberlane
Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n, - N.H. -, 317 A.2d 555
(1974); School Committee of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, - R.I. -, 299 A.2d

441 (1973).

,

53. 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958).
2d 567, 572,
54. Board of Educ. of Community Unit Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill.
207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965).

2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970); Peters
55. See County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill.

2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969).
v. South Community Hospital, 44 I11.

56.

ILL. CONSr.

art. VIII, § 1 (1870).

It should also be noted that aside from the
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sion with regard to this pronouncement Was that school employees
were the agents to fulfill this duty, and as such, they must refrain
from any conduct which would render the schools less efficient and
thorough. 57 The severe attacks on this reasoning underscore the
need for the supreme court to fully review its position.
Furthermore, the Pawtucket case itself, primarily relied upon by
the Redding court, has seen its effect modified by a more recent Rhode
Island decision, School Committee of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Association.58
Essentiality
It is contended by those who adhere to this line of argument that
governmental services are by and large essential. These services differ from those of the private sector by their very nature and are usually incapable of being replaced by alternative suppliers. Moreover,
the loss of these services often results in immediate and irreparable
harm to the safety and welfare of the public. Finally, assuming that
differentiation could be made between some essential and non-essential services, it would be difficult to do so. Therefore, it is contended
the best solution is to ban all strikes by public employees. This is the
current philosophy of the Illinois Supreme Court, as pronounced in
Redding and reiterated in Pana:
Ordinarily the functions provided by government are not of such
a nature that substitution of product or of service is possible, as it
often is in the case of strikes in the private sector. Moreover,
sovereignty aspects of this argument, the public policy aspect of the constitutional mandate has been attacked as faulty in its own right. The first ground for such attack is
that the constitution has been changed, and the relevant portion now states: "The State
shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and
services." ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1970). The effect of this change seems, to this
author, to be immaterial.
Of more substance is the second ground, that the Illinois School Code in § 24-11, ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 122, § 10-19, 24-11 (1973), requires that the teachers work the number
of days required by § 10-19 (185 days on the calendar so as to insure 176 teaching days)
sometime between July 1 and the following June 30th. Nothing is said as to the day
school must start, therefore, a strike of any duration less than that making the required
days impossible to attain does not prevent the local district from providing for educational services.
57. Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 I11. 2d
567, 572, 207 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1965).
58.

-

R.I. -,

-,

299 A.2d 441i 445 (1973).

The court held that even though

Pawtucket was still good law for the proposition that strikes were illegal:
[N]o temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the
adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts . . . that irreparable
harm will result .

. .

. The mere failure of a public school system to begin

its school year on the appointed day cannot be classified as a catastrophic
event. (emphasis added).
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strikes of public employees are very apt to create immediate
emergencies bearing sharply upon the health, safety and welfare of
the public. 59
This is also the position taken by many advocates of no-strike provisions in collective bargaining legislation. 0
The problem with this reasoning is that it defies two basic guidelines
of our judicial system: logic and experience. It should be remembered that this rationale is being offered to distinguish public employees from private sector employees in order to withstand attacks
based upon denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. To be consistent with this distinction, there must be some compelling necessity about their services which does not exist in the private
sector. Few would dispute that certain employees may well fit this category, i.e., firemen, policemen, and prison guards; but can it seriously be argued that strikes by public zoo keepers, librarians, or golf
course employees are more paralyzing to society then strikes by private utility workers or private hospital employees? Indeed, there is
no difference in the impact on community welfare between striking
public school bus drivers and private school bus drivers, or between pri61
vate utility workers and their public counterparts.
The situation is the same with school teachers. An oft-quoted
phrase puts this in proper perspective:
Schools are closed for summer, Christmas, Easter, and Thanksgiving vacations, for football games, basketball tournaments, harvesting, teachers' conventions, inclement weather, presidential visits,
and for a host of other reasons without anyone getting excited over
the harm done to children. But if schools are closed for one
day as a result of a teacher strike, the time lost supposedly constitutes irreparable damage62 to them. Intellectually, this is not an
overwhelming argument.
There has been a wealth of criticism attacking the logic of this es59.
60.
61.

City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 553, 316 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1974).
See Shaw and Clark, supra note 17, at 645.
See Guinan, The Unreal Distinction Between Public and Private Sectors, 96
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Guinan]. In speaking on this distinction Guinan says:
Here in San Francisco, the city maintains a zoo to care for a lot of interesting
animals. Its employees are in the public sector. The city has also some distinguished private hospitals. Their employees are in the private sector. If we
are to develop more potent alternatives to the strike in areas where a strike
would threaten the greater harm to the public welfare, should we be more concerned over a strike in a zoo than in a hospital?
In Philadelphia, the retail liquor stores are state-owned and operated. The
gas and electric utilities are private corporations. I know I am risking some
facetious replies, but I ask you, would Philadelphians be better off without electricity and gas or without Scotch and gin?
62.

(1966).

M.
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sential, non-essential dichotomy.6 3 It has come not only from labor
experts, but the judiciary as well. At present, the highest courts of
Michigan,6 4 Rhode Island,65 and New Hampshire 6 have refused to

issue injunctions in teacher-strike situations without a showing of irreparable harm to the community.
In addition, there have recently been several major field research
studies whose conclusions lend support -to those attacking the essentiality argument. The first was done during the Philadelphia teacher
strikes of 1972 and 1973, and found no significant difference in pupil
achievement between those who were out of school during the eight
weeks of the strike and those who had not missed class. 67 The
second, done here in Illinois, analyzed impasse resolution strategies
and made an in-depth study of seven 1972 Illinois teacher strikes."
The conclusions not only emphasize the necessity of the strike strategy as facilitating meaningful, good faith bargaining and terminating impasses, but also that:
[T]he strike did not create imminent peril or risk to the health
and safety of69 the community in any of the seven school districts
investigated.
This is not to suggest that a teachers' strike could never pose a
threat to the safety and welfare of the community. Those legislatures
and courts who have refused to proscribe all such strikes have nevertheless retained the authority to enjoin public sector strikes when an
imminent danger to the community is presented. 0 This is preferable
63. See D. WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, supra note 39, at 6:114; Imundo, Some Comparaisons Between Public Sector and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 24 LAB. L.J. 810
(1973); Guinan, supra note 61, at 46.
64. See School Dist. for the City of Holland v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314,
157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
65. See School Committee of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, - R.I. -, 299
A.2d 441 (1973).
66. See Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n, N.H. -, 317 A.2d 555 (1974); see also Town of Dedham v. Labor Relations Committee, - Mass. -, 312 N.E.2d 548 (1974) (where it appears that to enjoin a strike, a
school board must first go through the Labor Relations Committee for approval).
67. Lytle & Janoff. The Effects (if Any) of a Teacher Strike on Student Achievement, 55 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 270 (1973); see also Alderfer, Follow-up on the Pennsylvania School Strikes, 25 LAB. L.J. 161 (1974). Alderfer points out tlat impressions of
the Pennsylvania law allowing limited strike privileges were favorable and it is generally
accepted as good law. He also states that most observers view the effects of the strikes
that have occurred since its enactment as minimal.
68. L. Halter, An Analysis of Impasse Resolution Strategies in Public Education Bargaining Disputes, February, 1975 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation available at the Loyola
U. of Chicago Library).
69. Id. at 212.
70. See Philadelphia Federation of Teachers v. Ross, 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 204, 301 A.2d
405 (1973). An injunction was granted following a showing of a clear and present danger to the health, safety and welfare of the public. The proof consisted of such things
as increased gang activity and $133,000 per day expense for additional police protection.
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to an outright ban on all public employee strikes under the somewhat
questionable rationale that they are apt to create "immediate emergencies bearing sharply upon the health, safety and welfare of the

public."

1

Distortionof PoliticalProcess
The third major argument against public sector strikes looks not
only to the immediate effects of such activity, but to the possible long
range effects such strikes might have on the political process.72 This
analysis views public sector strikes as basically political in nature; the
loss of essential services causes pressures from the constituency for
early settlement which forces governmental employers to adopt measures which are politically expedient rather than economically sound.
This would then allow the stronger public unions a disproportionate
share of the available public funds. The argument is a valid one and
the more essential the service, the more dangerous is the possibility

of political expediency.

It is not at all difficult to envision state

funds being diverted from welfare funding to pay salary increases for

striking policemen or firemen.

Professors Wellington and Winter,

the major proponents of this argument, indicate this has already happened in one instance in which state urban aid funds were diverted to
salary increases for police and firemen in New Jersey.73
However, the argument advanced is not an end in itself-it is an
admonition. The solution would seem to lie not in outright bans of
public sector strikes, but in legislation providing alternatives to impasse resolution. 74
See note 26, supra, for examples of statutory limits which are imposed on public employees. Most states allow injunctions when threats to health, safety, or welfare of the public are shown.
71. City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 553, 316 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1974).
72. See Wellington & Winter, supra note 48, at 1124.
73. Id. at 1124 n.59.
74. Many authorities have urged adoption of alternative impasse resolution rather
than strikes. See Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67
MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969). He states that only in a police state can absolute guarantees
against strikes be possible. He favors political collective bargaining with voluntary or
binding arbitration. See Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations,
85 HARV. L. REV. 459 (1971). He suggests that blanket bans do not work and proposes
a nonstoppage strike where both employees and employer pay money to a special fund
and a graduated strike where workers would stop, with a corresponding wage loss during
a portion of their usual workweek. See Bilik, Toward Public Sector Equality: Extending the Strike Privilege, 21 LAB. L.J. 338 (1970). Bilik's argument is an interesting one
in that he believes that the giving of unconditional strike rights would serve as a deterrent to strikes. He asserts that with such a right an incumbent higher degree of responsibility is created. Presently, with strikes illegal, public employees do not have the one
fear their private counterparts experience: the possibility of an extended strike with accompanying economic hardship. When public employees go on strike, they count on
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APPLICATION

The application of the anti-injunction law7 5 to public employee
strikes was the major issue of the Pana case. Whether strikes by such
employees are per se illegal, or unlawful only when endangering
the public welfare and safety, the mode of dealing with them is the
injunction. 7" However, as will be subsequently discussed, there are
jurisdictions which limit the injunctive relief available despite legislative prohibitions against striking public employees.
The Illinois Supreme Court has approached this issue from a public policy perspective. The first relevant case was, of course, the Redding decision. Although the anti-injunction law was not at issue, the
court granted the injunctive relief sought primarily because of its
holding that strikes against a government employer are unlawful.
However, the court went on in justification of its position by articulating the public policy concerns it felt were mandated by the constitutional provision providing for proper and efficient education of the
children. 77 Although apparently dicta, these policy concerns were
echoed in two subsequent cases dealing squarely with the anti-injunction law.
The first, Peters v. South Chicago Community Hospital,78 involved
a strike by private employees of a not-for-profit hospital. Noting that
such employees were expressly excluded from coverage by the National
Labor Relations Act, 79 the court reversed the appellate court's decision
their employer forcing them back to work. Without this so called "protection," the author feels public employees would think twice before striking. See Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885 (1973). The author
suggests the extension of the duration of the impasse procedures which will function in
part as strike substitutes.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (1973):
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of this State,
or by a judge or the judges thereof in any case involving or growing out of
a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, enjoining or restraining any person or persons, either singly or in concert, from terminating any
relation of employment or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from
peaceably and without threats or intimidation recommending, advising, or persuading others so to do; or from peaceably and without threat or intimidation
being upon any public street, or thoroughfare or highway for the purpose of
obtaining or communicating information, or to peaceably and without threats
or intimidation persuade any person or persons to work or to abstain from
working, or to employ or to peaceably and without threats or intimidation
cease to employ any party to a labor dispute, or to recommend, advise, or persuade others so to do.
76. See Halligan, Enjoining Public Employees' Strikes: Dealing With Recalcitrant
Defendants, 19 DEPAUL L. Rev. 298 (1969).
77. Board of Educ. of Community Unit Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 575,
207 N.E.2d 427, 432 (1965).
78. 44 Ill. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1973). Subsequent legislation has placed these employees
of nonprofit hospitals under the protection of the N.L.R.A.
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that the operation of the hospital involved a public interest of such
urgency that labor's right to strike must yield. In so doing, it stated:
The language of the statute is clear and it makes no exceptions
for hospitals . . . .Unlike Redding there is no overriding expression of public policy here such as the constitutional mandate that
the General Assembly shall "provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools . ..
The second case raising the issue of the applicability of the anti-injunction law, City of Peoria v. Benedict, involved striking municipal
employees of a nursing home. The court succinctly stated:
In Peters . . . we held the Illinois anti-injunction law applicable
to employees of a non-profit hospital. For the same reasons
stated therein, we find the anti-injunction act applicable to the
instant case. 8 '
The result, as noted by members of 'the Ogilvie Commission, was
a state of confusion.8 2 The feeling of observers and commentators
was that in Illinois, the rather anomalous result was that an injunction could be issued against striking school employees, but not against
other public employee groups unless comparable constitutional or legislative policy could be found.83
This was further confirmed by the appellate court in Pana, which
failed to find any substantial distinction in public service between the
nursing home employees in Benedict and the various functions being performed by the striking municipal employees of Pana.8" Additionally, the concession is made in the appellant brief for the city of
Pana that:
[T]he Benedict-Peters rationale requires courts to take a different approach when they consider injunctions against striking public employees. Instead of simply barring all strikes by public employees, the Court must now consider the public service being offered and decide whether there are sufficient constitutional and/or
legislative expressions of public policy which override the Anti-Injunction Act.8 5
It is obvious from the briefs filed in the Pana case that both parties
80. 44 111. 2d 22, 27, 253 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1969).
81. 47 Ill. 2d 166, 169-70, 265 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929
(1971).
82. OGILVIE REPORT, supra note 16, at 22.
83. Id. at 23. See Shaw and Clark, supra note 17, at 629; Note, Teacher Negotiations in Illinois: Current Status and Proposed Reforms, 1973 U. ILL. L. FORUM 307,

332-33.
84. City of Pana v. Crowe, 13 Ill.
App. 3d 90, 93, 299 N.E.2d 770, 772 (1973),
rev'd, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
85. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill.
2d 547, 316
N.E.2d 513 (1974).
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and the Illinois Education Association as amicus curiae felt the pivotal question was whether or not any provision could be found in the
constitution or legislative enactments to warrant excluding the particular employees involved from coverage by the anti-injunction law.
The supreme court chose not to be constrained by the rather narrow
issues presented. In an inexplicable excursion into judicial legislation,
the court declared the anti-injunction act applicable only to lawful
activity. Since strikes by governmental employees were considered unlawful in 1925, Justice Schaefer reasoned that it could not possibly
have been meant to apply to work stoppages by public employees.8 6
Support for the decision was found in a 1934 Illinois case, Fenske
Brothers v. Upholsterers Union8 7 and a 1947 United States Supreme
Court decision, United States v. United Mine Workers of America. 8
Fenske involved an attack on the constitutionality of the Illinois AntiInjunction Act. It was interpreted by the court in Pana as holding the
statute in question applicable only to lawful conduct. United Mine
Workers provided additional support since it had held the Norris-LaGuardia Act,8 9 the federal anti-injunction law, inapplicable to unlawful
strikes by federal government employees.9 0
The result brings forth a trilogy of unanswered inquiries. First,
what compelled the court to, in effect, reverse its prior Peters-Benedict position? In Benedict, the Illinois Supreme Court was urged to
apply the same rule of construction to the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act
as the Supreme Court of the United States had applied to the NorrisLaGuardia Act. The County of Peoria, as appellee, argued that, like
its federal counterpart, the Illinois act must use express language to
divest the sovereign of its rights against striking public employees. Additionally, since Redding had denied the right to strike to municipal
employees, appellees argued that such employees "could not come
within the purview of the anti-injunction act, expressly or impliedly." 9 1
This argument was rejected in Benedict but was revitalized by the
Pana court. This inexplicable reversal brings forth a second question. How could the court base its newly-found rationale on the
Fenske case? The Pana court construed Fenske as holding that the
purpose of -the statute was to prohibit only the enjoining of lawful
86. City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 I1. 2d 547, 548-50, 316 N.E.2d 513, 513-14 (1974).
87. 358 I1. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
88. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1970).
90. City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 111. 2d 547, 550, 316 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1974).
91. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 12-13, County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Iil. 2d
166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970).
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conduct, and they quote extensively from it to support this conclusion.9 2 In so doing, the Pana court apparently misapprehended both
the statute and the Fenske decision. The legislature did more than
prohibit the enjoining of lawful conduct; it defined what that lawful
conduct was now to be. This distinction is important if a case is to be
built for denying public employees coverage under the act simply because it was unlawful for them to strike in 1925.
Private sector employees at the time of this legislative enactment
were similarly restrained. As the Illinois Appellate Court only three
years after Fenske reminds us:
It is true that for many years, when essentially different views were
entertained by the courts of this and some other jurisdictions than
are now entertained concerning the relative rights of capital and
labor, it was held to be the law of this State that even peaceful
picketing was unlawful. However, since the enactment in 1925
of the Illinois Anti-Labor-Injunction Act and the decision of our
Supreme Court in Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International
Union, declaring that act constitutional, 'peaceful picketing and
peaceful persuasion' are no longer
unlawful in this State or the
3
proper subject of injunctive relief.1
The Fenske court attempted to reconcile its prior holdings with
the new guidelines established by 'the act. The quotation which appears in Pana was a reassurance to the employers involved that the
courts would not be precluded, by virtue of this act, from jurisdiction
to grant injunctive relief in all cases. The Fenske court dichotomized
labor activity into lawful conduct which the act now defined and protected (including peaceful picketing and persuasion), and unlawful
conduct which was still within the province of the court's injunctive
powers. The reference to unlawful conduct was very specific. The
court stated:
92. City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 I11. 2d 547, 549, 316 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1974):
Section 12 of article 6 of the constitution of this State provides: 'The circuit
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity." It is
urged that because that statute prohibits the issuance of injunctions against the
peaceable acts therein mentioned, the law deprives the circuit court of its jurisdiction fixed by the constitution and therefore contravenes that provision. In
Stephens v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., 303 I11.49, we said:
"The constitution confers upon the circuit court jurisdiction of all causes in
equity, and the legislature is without power to deprive it of any part of this
jurisdiction." It is to be noticed, however, that the statute in controversy does
not deprive circuit courts of jurisdiction to restrain any unlawful act, nor of
jurisdiction to determine whether or not any act complained of is legal or illegal. So far as the statute is concerned, circuit courts have the same jurisdiction in labor disputes they have always had, for it cannot be said that they
ever had the power, by the constituiton or otherwise, to prevent or penalize
the performance of lawful acts concerning which no cause of action existed.
03. Schuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 182, 12 N.E.2d
50, 52 (1937) (emphasis added).
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The law is, -that if the primary purpose is a malevolent one to
injure the employer or his business the object is unlawful . . . 94
In addition to unlawful objectives, -the court included unlawful
means: "[P]ersuasion, when so annoying as to become coercive,
amounts to intimidation and is unlawful."9
No reference was made to any particular class of employees; the
court contemplated unlawful activity as now encompassing conduct,
either violent and coercive or with intent to injure the employer.
The Pana court reached a tenuous conclusion in holding that by judicially categorizing public employee strikes as unlawful, it was within a
Fenske-based exclusion from anti-injunction application.
This leads to the third and final inquiry. If legal precedent does
not dictate the court's conclusions, what public policy considerations
do? To reverse the effect of prior decisions, some compelling rationale should be presented. This is especially true when granting
what is, in effect, a mandatory injunction. The Illinois courts
have voiced their concern about granting such injunctions and will
normally do so only in cases of great necessity."8 The Pana decision
can only lead to further distortion by the judiciary of long-settled principles.
There are other jurisdictions which refuse to allow such inconsistent
results. In the leading case, School District for the City of Holland v.
Holland Education Association, the court was faced with a Michigan statute prohibiting strikes by public employees. Nevertheless, the
court concluded:
We here hold it is insufficient merely to show that a concert
of prohibited action by public employees has taken place and
that ipso facto such a showing justifies injunctive relief. We so
hold because it is basically contrary to public policy in this State
to issue injunctions in labor disputes absent
a showing of violence,
97
irreparable injury, or breach of the peace.
The same rationale has recently been adopted by the Supreme
Courts of Rhode Island9" and New Hampshire. 99 Additionally, the
94. Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers International Union, 358 Ill.239, 247, 193 N.E.
112, 116 (1934).
95. id. at 258, 193 N.E. at 120.
96. See Ambassador Foods Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 43 Il1. App. 2d 100,
105, 192 N.E.2d 572, 575 (1963). The court considered a reinstatement of the status
quo and a return to work by the employees as essentially a mandatory injunction. Such
injunctions are only granted after a finding of "extreme urgency or great necessity."
97. 380 Mich. 314, 326, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968).
98. School Committee of Westerly v. Westerly Teachers Ass'n, - R.I. -, 299 A.2d
441 (1973).

99.

-,

Timberlane Regional School Dist. v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Ass'n, -

N.H.

317 A.2d 555 (1974).
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six states granting a limited right to strike use a similar approach. Although several jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion as the
Pana court as to the applicability of their own anti-injunction laws, their
rationale is similarly unpersuasive: that public employee strikes are illegal and therefore enjoinable. 00
CONCLUSION

The illegality issue is far from being resolved. It will not be resolved until the legislature acts responsibly and provides an appropriate framework for public sector bargaining. It is impossible to predict the ultimate form of such legislation, but its effectiveness will be
solely dependent on its resolution of the strike, no-strike issue. In the
interim, the responsibility lies not by choice, but rather by necessity,
with the judiciary. Regardless of how piecemeal and fragmented
their involvement, the courts must provide some of the answers.
The Redding decision may have been appropriate to 1965,101 but
its vitality has been severely diminished by the tenor of the present
public employee situation. Its rationale has been criticized, much of
its foundation from other jurisdictions has been modified, and its effect
as a strike deterrent has recently been negligible. 10 2 What is needed
is not reversion to antiquated proscription, as the court did in Pana.
The use of magical phrases such as "sovereignty" and "essentiality"
does not provide answers; this is merely a technique to avoid dealing
with the merits of the issues. If there are overriding public policy
considerations which mandate the chosen course, the Illinois Supreme
Court should discuss them with a forthright delineation of the fundamental issues involved and a well-reasoned resolution.
Public policy does demand protection from strikes endangering
safety and welfare, and the judiciary, in the face of legislative inaction, must intervene and provide it. As the vehicle for such intervention is the granting of injunctive relief, then it should be provided100.

See, e.g., Communication Workers of America v. Arizona Board of Regents, 17

Ariz. App. 398, 498 P.2d 472 (1972); Board of Educ. of Montgomery County v. Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n, 67 L.R.R.M. 2745 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1968); City of Minot v.
General Drivers & Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966).
101. But see Leahy, The Redding Decision and Reality, 55 ILL. BAR J. 834 (1967).
The author suggests that the Redding decision was unrealistic and ignored the fundamental characteristic of the strike.
102. In 1972-73 there were nationally 143 teacher strikes occurring in twenty states.
Illinois was the second highest with 16. GERR No. 541, D-1 (1974).
In 1974 there
have already been many Illinois teacher strikes; in Charleston, Freeport, Oak Park,
Woodstock, Addison Elementary, Addison and Villa Park High Schools, and Moraine
Valley College as of October, 1974. Many others were contemplated, but were avoided

by last minute settlements (e.g., Evanston and the city of Chicago's teachers).
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but only after a showing that irreparable harm is present. Failure to
adjust to the changing public sector situation can only lead to further
distortion of the court's use of its injunctive powers.
Finally, the judiciary itself faces the problem of an erosion of confidence. A court's effectiveness is dependent upon the moral persuasion its decisions generate in the community. When public policy and
social needs require change, it is incumbent upon this state's highest
court to adjust accordingly. Little can be gained from decisions blatantly ignored by those intended to be affected. Public employees
deserve more than restoration of decade-old rhetoric and injunctions
upheld on such tenuous authority as was done in Pana. The court
should reconsider its Pana position and establish a guideline more
consonant with present day exigencies. In so doing both the judiciary
and public employees will be better served.
MAx
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